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The Politics of Outsourcing Military Support Services 
Mark Erbel 
[This is the Accepted Manuscript. A proofed version of this draft has been published 
in the Routledge Research Companion on Security Outsourcing, eds. J. Berndtsson 
and C. Kinsey (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 231-240.] 
Introduction 
Despite expanding considerably over the past decade, there remain gaps in the 
literature on military outsourcing. So far, it has focused mostly on the history and reasons 
why (usually Western) armies hired the private sector (Kruck, 2013; Singer, 2008), how 
outsourcing was (or was not) regulated, the impact of this practice on civil-military 
relations (Avant, 2005; Krahmann, 2010; Bruneau, 2011), state authority (Leander, 
2006), and military effectiveness (Dunigan, 2011). More recently, the literature branched 
out to include normative and sociological perspectives on military outsourcing, some of 
which are contained in the last part of this book. Almost all of these examinations 
concentrated heavily on armed security contractors, especially in the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The literature however has not yet satisfactorily addressed the political 
foundation of military outsourcing which significantly underpins the areas of research 
surveyed above. This concerns the place of military outsourcing within the defence 
policy process, the question of who informs and makes decisions about outsourcing, and 
the political and military ramifications of using military services contractors. This is what 
is taken here to signify the politics of military outsourcing. 
This chapter therefore sets out, first, to suggest how best to study the defence 
services acquisition policy process – that is, the process in which the military procures 
services from private companies – and then, secondly, apply this approach to the politics 
and process of support services contracting in the USA and the UK.1 It seeks to enable us 
to better understand the background and drivers of military contracting policy, who 
                                                     
1 Here, military support services can be loosely summarised under the heading of military logistics 
which comprises all those services that enable the military the project and sustain military force, 
that is to move and supply troops and their equipment. See Tuttle (2005, p. 1). 
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makes this policy and why, and what the longer-term implications are both for military 
services contracting and for defence policy-making more widely. In particular, it enables 
us to take a step back and holistically examine the phenomenon of states contracting for 
military services, from its causes, politics, and process, to its implementation and long-
term ramifications. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it offers a conceptual toolbox for us to 
study the defence (services acquisition) policy process which draws on the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and Policy Network Theory. It then establishes, by tracing the 
historical trajectory of supplying the US and UK armies, the rules of admission to the 
relevant policy networks, that is the mechanisms that determine who participates in 
making acquisition policy. The chapter then goes on to map the defence services 
acquisition policy networks, discuss their strong ‘bias towards business’, and explore the 
bias’s main implications. The chapter concludes by tying together the different strands of 
the argument and offering an outlook for the longer-term trajectory of the outsourcing of 
military support services, suggesting that the future will see ‘more of the same’. 
A Conceptual Toolbox to Study the Defence Policy Process 
To date, the academic literature on the ‘privatisation of security’ has not put 
forward in-depth empirical or theoretical considerations about (the study of) the politics 
of military outsourcing and the role and place of contractors in the policy process. 
Moreover, the literature on defence policy-making more generally does not really offer 
approaches that would be able to include contractors either, at least none that can be 
applied to several countries because they are typically designed for specific states or even 
bureaucracies. Those with an interest in studying the politics, process, and implications 
of military services contracting therefore require a fresh approach. It is argued here that 
an approach that draws on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Policy Network 
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Theory is particularly suitable for the purpose of studying the defence services 
acquisition policy process with an eye on the ‘who’, ‘why’, and the ‘so what’. 
The policy process involves a complex set of actors who interact over long 
periods of time on a particular policy issue. Given the specialisation of policy issues, 
these processes usually occur in specialised domains or subsystems, such as – in our case 
– defence services acquisition. Actors are defined by their interests, beliefs, and 
resources, and we aggregate them into ‘advocacy coalitions’ in order to make our subject 
matter more manageable (Sabatier, 2007, p. 3; Sabatier and Weible, 2007, pp. 191–192). 
The most important resources for our purposes are an actor’s formal, legal authority to 
make binding decisions on policy, information and knowhow, mobilizable supporters 
and skilful leadership, money (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, pp. 201–203), and access to 
those holding the first type of resource. Actors interact in networks whose membership 
and structure are heavily influenced by external factors such as the international security 
environment, the political-economic structure of the state, defence-technological 
developments, as well as the domestic political-institutional structure of the state within 
which policy is made. Depending on who is part of the process, the network may display 
a more or less prominent ‘selectivity’ which narrows down the range of options that are 
perceived to be within the realms of the possible, practicable, or feasible by decision-
makers (Adam and Kriesi, 2007; Döhler, 1991, p. 251). Policy is therefore decided and 
implemented at the end of a series of events and processes which narrows down the list 
of alternatives, but which also – importantly – feeds back to affect both the external 
factors and the network that produced the policy decision. In summary, the external 
factors strongly circumscribe who is admitted to a policy network; the composition of a 
policy network strongly circumscribes its outcomes; and outcomes feed back to 
potentially affect both the external factors and the network. 
Compared to the typically static, state-centric approaches to defence policy-
making, the above reminds us to always remain cognizant of the wider context of the 
policy process, the nitty-gritty of how decisions come about, as well as how this may 
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affect the next policy cycle. Moreover, it does not imply that an actor’s official 
background necessarily tells us their views; for instance, a government official from the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) can just as well support or oppose the outsourcing of 
military support services, whereas other approaches would assume that a member of the 
MoD would represent the government’s or at least the MoD’s views and interests. 
Historical institutionalism would have come closest to enabling us to conduct these 
analyses, but it does not offer us a toolbox to dissect the minutiae of political decision-
making processes, especially those that do not necessarily have institutional or normative 
outcomes. 
We will observe the first set of the aforementioned factors by tracing the history 
of how the USA and the UK supplied their armed forces since the end of World War II in 
the next section, before turning to identifying the key actors. 
Admission to the Policy Network in Historical Context 
A good place to begin identifying who is admitted to defence services 
acquisition policy networks and why, is the historical trajectory of outsourcing, in 
particular asking why states turned to the market for military capability in the first place. 
In identifying the causes of contractorisation we can deduce the types of resources that 
are most likely to lead to an actor’s admission to the policy network. The chapters in Part 
One of this book described the context within which states incrementally turned to the 
private sector for military support services. From there, we can extract five key themes 
that will help us identify the admission mechanisms to the relevant policy networks: 
political-strategic commitments, the state of the economy and governments’ budgets, 
defence technology and functionalism, ideas about the organisation of the armed forces 
and the economy, and bureaucratic and organizational factors. 
Since the end of World War II and the creation of large, standing, peacetime 
armies, defence policy in the USA and the UK has been marked by three interlinked 
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factors. On the one hand, both states espouse – relative to their size – expansive grand 
strategies, epitomised by forward leaning global defence postures and, in the case of the 
USA, a high military presence in virtually every corner of the globe (Pettyjohn, 2012). 
The UK, while reducing its global footprint in terms of boots on the ground nonetheless 
seeks to retain significant, rapid power projection capabilities which should ultimately 
enable the UK military to deploy to far-away theatres of operation within short time 
spans (Croft et al., 2001; Baylis, 1986; Hartley, 1997). Such postures, once espoused, 
must be supplied in order to be credible and realised. Both states in this context place top 
priority on fielding the most sophisticated weapon systems, wishing to have a 
technological edge (UK) or even dominance and superiority (USA) compared to the rest 
of the world. As the former US Secretary of Defense William Cohen put it, the USA, 
once in combat, did ‘not want a fair fight … but capabilities that will give [them] a 
decisive advantage.’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 1997, Secretary's Message) The 
British military similarly intends to remain ‘capable of competing decisively with the full 
spectrum of potential adversaries, as one of the most effective and capable armies in the 
world.’ (UK Army, 2012, p. 3) Importantly, for our purposes, both states from the very 
early stages of the Cold War faced a gap between these political-strategic commitments, 
technological demands, and the available resources that has dominated defence policy-
making ever since (Edmonds, 1986, pp. 12–13; Stewart, 2005, p. 258). 
Both states sought to overcome this gap not by reducing either their strategic 
commitments or their reliance on hi-tech weapon systems, which had been strong driving 
forces behind the growing role of industry within the defence enterprise. Rather, most 
significantly, they sought efficiencies from the marketplace from the 1960s onwards. 
Beginning with Secretary McNamara’s ‘whiz kids’ in the USA and, shortly thereafter, 
Macmillan and Mountbatten in the UK, both states started to model their defence 
enterprises along ideas, concepts, and processes borrowed from the corporate world. 
Presaging the onset of New Public Management techniques that are generally seen to 
have become entrenched from the late 1970s onwards, formerly political problems such 
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as the military’s force structure became first and foremost technical, functional, and 
susceptible to various forms of economic analysis (Erbel, 2014, chapter 3; Novak, 2009, 
pp. 24–25). As a result, over several decades both states transformed their militaries from 
self-sufficient to professional, core competency armies that focus narrowly on combat 
(cf. Kinsey, 2009). The share of the defence ‘pie’ handed to private contractors grew, and 
both governments came to depend on them even more than before for non-combat 
services, in particular in the military logistics sphere. 
Today, defence policy – and defence acquisition in particular – are therefore 
strongly circumscribed by the force of several ideas that are intimately tied to the 
historical developments above, namely the beliefs in forward-leaning defence postures, 
high-technology rather than large manpower, technical rather than political problem-
solving, and the virtues of the private sector. Organisationally this translated into core 
competency armies which combine with contractors to form the ‘total force’ (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006, p. 75). Overall, these processes occurred under the 
constant impression of a lack of resources. 
As the next section shows, these factors directly affect the composition of the 
policy networks in such a way that advantages those actors who represent rather than 
challenge these ideas and structures, and who hold the ‘resources’ associated with 
managerialism, technology, and functional rather than political problem-solving. 
Generally speaking, these actors are industry representatives, advocates of outsourcing, 
and the government executive that has set these policies, while the legislatures and 
military gradually lost prominence in the process (Krahmann, 2010, pp. 145–153; Gholz 
and Sapolsky, 1999/2000, p. 16). 
Mapping the Defence Services Acquisition Policy Network 
The decades of increasingly industry-centric defence policy-making on 
manpower, force structure, and various support services as explained in the previous 
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paragraphs left indelible marks on the defence services acquisition policy networks in 
both the USA and the UK. A detailed examination of who advises the US Department of 
Defense (DoD) on its various advisory boards, who consults DoD on technical and 
technological developments, and who lobbies DoD and the US Congress on acquisition-
related issues has revealed that overwhelmingly these actors can be grouped together as 
advocates of contractorisation. The same applies to the equivalent processes in the UK 
(Erbel, 2014, chapter 4). 
For instance, in 2012 Congress was debating whether to change the practice of 
acquiring ‘commercial items’, an issue that had been on the agenda intermittently in the 
past when the definition of ‘commercial items’ was considerably expanded (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1998; Preston, 1995; Schaaf, Derek J. Vander, 1995). 
‘Commercial items’, in general, are goods (and increasingly services) that should be 
available more or less off-the-shelf from commercial vendors to the general public and 
therefore have an accepted market price. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO), 
a ‘good-government’ NGO in the USA that has long scrutinized the government’s 
contracting practices, reported on a number of instances over the years in which the 
military had falsely drawn on commercial items legislation. They include the acquisition 
of C-130J aircraft as commercial items (eventually overturned with the help of Senator 
John McCain) or of industrial quantities of fuel in the warzone of Iraq which it argued 
are not commercially available from vendors, certainly not in warzones (U.S. 
Department of Defense, Inspector General, 2009, p. 3; Amey, 2012a). In 2012, both 
POGO and the Professional Services Council (PSC), an industry trade group of federal 
contractors with several hundred member companies, mounted substantial lobbying 
efforts to support or oppose an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 
that had been requested by DoD and that would have curtailed the military’s ability to 
invoke the ‘commercial items’ clause (Amey, 2012; Soloway, 2012). Postponing a final 
decision on the matter, Congress decided against DoD’s request and extended the 
practice until 2015 (U.S. Congress, 2013, Section 822), handing industry advocates a 
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victory over a government agency and an oversight NGO that sought to make public 
spending more transparent and accountable. Such acquisitions are increasingly often for 
services or alternatively for goods that require a sizeable service component such as the 
maintenance of equipment or the delivery of supplies. They are therefore highly pertinent 
but under-examined examples for the examination of military services contracting. This 
issue also shows that even the responsible government agency could not sway the 
legislature to decide against what was at the time one of the most contentious issues for 
contracting officers in DoD, but rather decided to follow industry’s advocacy. 
Other examples, from an attempt to ‘insource’ military responsibilities (i.e. 
return them from industry to the armed forces) to Congressional hearings on the cost of 
outsourcing military services to contractors further underscore this point. Industry’s 
presence is often overwhelming, ranging from trade groups to armies of consultants, 
industry representatives, and a number of think tanks. The small opposing coalition’s 
success therefore hinges critically on support from individual decision-makers, which is 
much less stable and predictable (Erbel, 2014, chapter 4). This situation is even more 
pronounced in the government executive, within the confines of the defence enterprise, 
where POGO – which is the most relevant of only a small number of organisations – has 
practically no access to relevant policy-makers and high-ranking departmental managers 
(Amey, 2012a). Industry, meanwhile, is pro-actively sought out by government officials 
to provide expertise and opinions on acquisition policy in fora such as the Defense 
Science Board or the Defense Business Board (CREW (Citizens for Responsibility and 
Ethics in Washington), 2012, pp. 1–2). The President and CEO of the PSC, for instance, 
has frequent contact ranging across the military and civilian chains of command in DoD, 
up to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. His organisation – like many other industry 
groups and company representatives – is routinely invited to participate in task forces on 
acquisition and outsourcing-related issues (Soloway, 2012a), which usually do not 
involve POGO-type NGOs, labour unions, or other actors who are generally critical of 
the government’s relationship with and reliance on the private sector for much of its 
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military-enabling capability. POGO, by contrast, has no direct access and thus at most 
‘may send a letter’ to the acquisition offices in DoD (Amey, 2012a). 
In the UK, unequal access to and relative influence in the defence acquisition 
policy process are even more pronounced. There is no equivalent organisation to POGO, 
and the UK Parliament has only very limited sway over the minutiae of defence 
spending. Thus, whereas industry and NGOs – through the US Congress – can lobby on 
individual ‘line items’ of the National Defense Authorization Act, the UK Parliament 
cannot significantly determine what the MoD spends its budget on and is therefore much 
less prevalent in the process. Moreover, there are no continuous advisory structures such 
as the Defense Science or Business Boards, with the MoD drawing on external advice in 
a much more ad hoc manner. Similar to the USA, industry is all but alone in accessing 
defence decision-makers and implementers, i.e. those with the authority to make or 
implement legally binding decisions or managing and generating defence outcomes 
across the hierarchy and throughout the process. For instance, task groups on the design 
and implementation of ongoing outsourcing projects are typically not public, by-
invitation only, ad hoc, and therefore only open to those experts who are regarded to add 
value to a discussion which takes contractorisation as a given (Erbel, 2014, chapter 4). 
This is mirrored by the access to the highest levels of the MoD: data on external visits to 
the senior defence leadership shows that the private sector accounts for the vast majority 
of outsiders who meet with MoD ministers and senior staff. With ministers, the average 
was 72.4 percent between 2010 and 2013, while for senior staff (in particular permanent 
secretaries, the Chief of Defence Materiel, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, and 
several other ‘3* and 4*’ civilians and military officers) this figure stands at 91.6 
percent. The remaining visits were made overwhelmingly by military charities and 
journalists, while labour unions had only eleven visits with ministers (compared to 
hundreds by industry) and zero with senior staff members. No organisations critical of 
overseas contracting met with MoD’s leadership (Gov.uk, 2013a; 2013b). 
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Neither political parties nor civil society are notably present in these policy 
debates. While the former is explained by the fact that military contracting has become a 
non-partisan issue (Stanger, 2009, pp. 12–13; Krahmann, 2010, p. 119), the latter is 
mostly a result of the relative disinterest of the public in the details of foreign and 
defence policy (Rothkopf, 2005, pp. 3–5) , especially when compared to domains such as 
welfare spending. Labour unions, especially regarding overseas contracting, are also all 
but absent from the process, leaving the field wide open for industry. 
A ‘Bias towards Business’ and Selectivity in the Policy Process 
As the previous section suggests, structurally there is a pronounced ‘bias towards 
business’,2 epitomised in the skewed access to decision-makers and advisory structures in 
favour of pro-contracting advocates as well as the integral role played by and assigned to 
the defence services industry in the wider defence enterprise. Even though access to 
decision-makers does not automatically translate into influence, its imbalance is 
nonetheless noteworthy. It strongly indicates a significantly enhanced potential to 
influence policy on the side of industry to affect both the UK and the US governments’ 
defence acquisition policies when compared to the ‘good government’ or ‘government 
oversight’ advocacy coalition. Moreover, in many cases, this access is granted 
specifically because governments seek the input of industry for the running of the 
defence enterprise in general and their relationship with industry and outsourcing 
practices in particular (see e.g. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Business Board, 
2009; Lane, 2013). 
In our case, this bias directly translates into a significant level of selectivity of 
the defence services acquisition policy network. Insourcing – as was shown – has no 
chance of success. National ownership and state control over defence matters are 
increasingly seen as anathema. Private sector discourse and practice have generally taken 
                                                     
2 This term is borrowed from Webb Yackee and Webb Yackee (2006). 
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such a strong foothold that even the federal labour unions in the USA, which are seen to 
be the most vocal, aggressive, and potentially successful opponents of domestic 
outsourcing, by now claim as a victory that future competitions between public and 
private providers must at least include a ‘guesstimate’ of cost savings before tasks are 
moved to private contractors (Gage, 2012). 
This state of affairs is not a necessary outcome without any alternative, but rather 
results from the formal and informal state and administrative structures within which 
outsourcing occurs. On the one hand, we saw that industry has very good access to 
decision-makers, which takes both formal and informal character. Advocates who are 
critical of contracting, on the other hand, have comparatively negligible, volatile access. 
Additionally, they suffer from a lack of business credentials and expertise which both 
governments crave more than, for example, oversight skills. Additionally, the few checks 
and balances that could exist – most importantly in the US Congress – do not fulfil their 
roles adequately. While the US Congress could but does not take an interest in day-to-
day contracting except in exceptional circumstances (Dickinson, 2011, pp. 8–9), the UK 
Parliament does not even have the prerogatives to directly and bindingly affect how the 
MoD spends its budget on private service providers in individual instances. Its most 
powerful tool are reports, for instance by the National Audit Office or parliamentary 
subcommittees, which however generally hold government to account for past practice. 
While this may affect future policy and practice, it does not compare to the influence the 
US Congress has on detailed acquisition plans. Meanwhile, the militaries in both 
countries, following decades of centralisation that came at the expense of the armed 
services’ autonomy (Stewart, 2005, pp. 258, 273-274; Self, 2010, pp. 266-270), gradually 
lost much of their ability to oppose the incremental shift of responsibilities to the private 
sector. Those who reach the senior ranks unsurprisingly do not oppose the status quo 
politics and practice of contracting. The lower ranks, meanwhile, must vent their 
potential opposition through this very chain of command which by conviction or 
necessity supports outsourcing, or at least will unlikely risk their positions to oppose 
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long-standing government policy without strong cause. Moreover, as one observer 
pointed out, in the USA in particular, many of the tasks that were outsourced to industry 
were previously fulfilled by reservists ‘who often complain the loudest’, further reducing 
potential opposition from within the ranks (Mayer, 2004). 
The process therefore offers only very few ‘veto-points’, i.e. points in time and 
venues in which the status quo could be effectively opposed and altered. Even the most 
high-profile endeavour in the past years that was possibly the most critical of outsourcing 
was no exception: the Commission on Wartime Contracting in the USA did not even 
consider fundamentally rethinking or revisiting the military’s reliance on contractors but 
merely sought to improve the practice. This is noteworthy because the commission and 
in particular the driving force behind it, Senator Claire McCaskill, were seen as having 
stepped outside the accepted mainstream for being overly critical of the status quo and of 
industry (Anonymous, 2012). In other words, even the most outsourcing-critical effort of 
the past years departed from the assumption that military outsourcing well into the future 
is a given, not a potentially alterable state of affairs. 
Some of the more recent developments in military logistics lend support to this 
argument. To name but two examples, the National Defense Authorization Act 2013, for 
instance, contained a series of clauses that cement the use of contractors directly and 
indirectly in the USA. It calls on the military to use a model of logistics support that 
inevitably leads to long-term, deeply integrated public-private cooperation, so-called 
‘performance-based logistics’, as well as to include contingency contracting in the 
military education curriculum (U.S. Congress, 2013, Sections 823, 845). In the UK, 
meanwhile, the creation of what is essentially a public-private logistics force structure, 
the ‘Total Support Force’, goes even a step further in ensuring that support services 
contracting is here to stay (UK Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 23). The USA is currently 
developing a similar construct, the ‘Joint Logistics Enterprise’, which however has not 
yet reached the level of implementation. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the debate 
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and practice of supporting and supplying the UK and US armed forces will depart from 
the standard assumption that industry is integral to that effort. 
Outlook and Conclusions 
This chapter set out to propose a way to study the role and relevance of 
contractors in the defence policy process and applied that approach to the USA and the 
UK. In so doing, it sought to address a gap in the literature by providing a policy-based 
explanation for why these states resort to outsourcing in organising and running their 
defence enterprises and how this affects the likely future trajectory of military policy. It 
proposed an approach based on the concepts of advocacy coalitions and policy networks 
as the best way to conceptualise the policy process and its component parts. It then 
applied this framework to show how the very drivers of contracting – a combination of 
political-strategic, economic, technological, ideational, and organisational factors – by 
now strongly circumscribe who can participate in the defence services acquisition policy 
process. This was shown to overwhelmingly comprise stakeholders in the process, while 
both veto-points and veto-players are all but absent. As a result, as far as the currently 
perceived range of policy alternatives – the political agenda – is concerned, outsourcing 
is the default practice which governments seek to improve but no longer question per se. 
It is reasonable to assume that this is unlikely to change as long as political 
parties do not clash on this issue, as long as parliaments cannot or do not place checks on 
the current process, and as long as veto-points are not enforced. The exception would be, 
of course, if the wider structures within which outsourcing occurs – our political 
economic system, defence strategic outlook, and the belief in the virtues of technology to 
name but three – abjectly failed or experienced external ‘shocks’. Only then could the 
USA and the UK be expected to reconsider the fundamental, underlying causes that led 
them to contract out military capability in the first place. The evidence suggests that this 
is unlikely for very many years to come: gradual change from within or outside is not to 
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be expected; instead, only considerable ‘shocks’ could unsettle this very stable 
ecosystem. 
The chapter thus offers new angles to the literature and research agenda on the 
causes, politics, and future of military outsourcing. Having focused on the USA and the 
UK here, future research should assess the validity of these causal links in other contexts, 
that is non-Western, non-democratic, and/or smaller states. Structurally, the chapter’s 
findings question the view that the roots of outsourcing only go back to the 1980s or the 
end of the Cold War; rather, we traced them back to the persistent gap between resources 
and defence-strategic commitments which emerged immediately after World War II. The 
end of the Cold War was thus merely the point in time when tentative practices such as 
outsourcing were reinforced and accelerated. This finding also sheds a critical light on 
the view that the wider phenomenon of military outsourcing can be understood by 
focusing primarily on armed security contracting. It is in the very least questionable 
whether states would have opted for outsourcing security had they not had the long 
experience of support service contracting, a claim that future research should assess. 
Moreover, the pressures which led to outsourcing security services are the same as those 
that led to logistics contracting. Logistics therefore, given its longer, trailblazing history, 
larger manpower involved, and the higher costs, is the more suitable, representative case 
study of the wider phenomenon. On the level of agency, the chapter highlighted the 
importance of decision-making networks; if we do not ask who is involved in informing, 
making, and ultimately implementing defence-strategic, economic, and acquisition 
policy, we are unable to fully understand the reasons, process, or future of military 
outsourcing. 
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